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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a simple macroeconomic model based on 
Svensson (1994). The model incorporates innovations that provide for a 
simultaneous explanation of the three basic findings in the empirical 
literature concerning the effects of the EMS on the levels of exchange rate 
risk and interest rate risk: the reduction in exchange rate variability 
when the degree of rigidity in the exchange rate commitment increases; 
the indetermination in the sign of the behaviour of exchange rate risk 
when this commitment eases; and, lastly, the possibility that, in some 
cases, a trade-off exists between exchange rate risk and interest rate 
risk, and that, in other cases, both move in the same direction. 

1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Council's Resolution of December 5,  1978 thet laid the 
foundations of the future Exchange Rete Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) stated thet the System should 
encourage the creation of "an area of stability in Europe" through "closer 
monetary cooperation". Stability has generally been understood to mean 
nominal stability, and, from this standpoint, attention must be paid not 
only to exchange rate stability but also to the System's impact on the 
stability of interest rates. 
In particular, it is worth asking whether the price for the lower 
exchange rate risk that presumably occurs within the EMS could be a 
higher interest rate risk. The possible transfer of risk from exchange 
rates to interest rates, rests on a fairly simple argument. On the one 
hand, Bachelor (1983, 1985) argues that modern economies generate a 
fixed amount of risk, and, therefore, the risk that disappears from the 
foreign exchange market should reappear in some other macroeconomic 
variable. On the other hand, the standard monetary models for 
determining exchange rates point towards the interest rate as the most 
obvious candidate to receive this transfer. 
In any event, the relevance of the problem is underscored when we 
consider that the possible existence of a trade-off between exchange rate 
risk and interest rate risk could have important regulstory implications 
if, as Bachelor (1985) and Artis and Taylor (1993) suggest, the group of 
economic agent� influenced by interest rate risk is larger than the group 
of agents negatively affected by exchange rate risk. 
The possible existence of a trade-off between exchange rate riak 
and interest rate risk has received appreclable attention in the literature, 
elbeit invariably from an exclusively empirical perspective'. However, 
, See, for example, European Commission (1982) , Padoa-Schioppe 
(1983) , Ungerer el ai. (1983, 1986) , Rogoff (1985), Artis and Taylor 
(1988, 1993), Ungerer el el. (1990) , Ayuso (1991, 1995), and Pesaran and 
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there are at least two factors that make it worthwhile to design a 
theoretical framework to complement the empirical findings. 
First, empirical tests run up agsinst the difficulty to isolate the 
true effect .of the exchange rate commitment from other effects, derived 
not only from the changes in other areas of domestic economic policy but 
also from tbe significant changes in tbe economic setting worldwide. In 
short, a pure test would require the impossible: a comparison of the risk 
levels in a given economy that belongs to the System witb those in tbe 
same -but outside the ERM- economy at the same time. In tbese 
conditions, a theoretical framework capable of providing an explanation 
for the empirical findings can prove very useful. 
Second, the empirical results are not conclusive with respect to the 
relationship between exchange rate risk and interest rate risk. In some 
cases, there appears to be a trade-off between the two; in others, 
however, both types of risk move in the same direction. This same 
indetermination also arises in the analysis of the relationship between 
exchange rate risk and the width of the fluctuation band allowed in the 
ERM: a narrower band does not always imply a higher level of exchange 
risk. Here, again, it is worth constructing a theoretical model that 
accommodates these findings to help understand their explanatory 
factors. 
Although numerous theoretical models deal with the impact of 
exchange rate policies on output and price stability (Gros, 1990, Beetsma 
and van der Ploeg, 1992, Sutherland, 1995), none specifically focuses on 
an analysis of exchange rate risk or on an analysis of its.relationship with 
interest rate risk. The most notable exception is Svensson (1994), which 
defends the existence of a trade-off between exchange and interest rate 
risk that justifies the existence of fluctuation bands around the central 
parity: the band allows for a certain degree of monetary independence. 
In this context, the purpose of this paper is to present a simple 
macroeconomic model, based on the one proposed by Svensson (1994). 
Robinson (1993). 
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The model incorporates innovations that provide for a simultaneous 
explanation of the three basic empirical findings obtained in the literature 
concerning the effects of the ERM on the levels of exchange rate risk and 
interest rate risk: the reduction in exchange rate variability observed 
when the degree of rigidity in the exchange rate commitment increases; 
the indetermination in the sign of the behaviour of exchange rate risk 
(i.e. variability corrected by credibility, see Ayuso, P�rez-Jurado and 
Restoy, 1994) when this commitment eases; and, lastly, the possibility 
that, in some cases, a trade-off exists between exchange rate risk and 
interest rate risk, and that, in other cases, both move in the same 
direction. The analysis under this model also helps to discern the relevant 
variables at play in these empirical findings. 
The paper has five sections. In the first two, the proposed model 
is presented and resolved. The third and fourth sections analyse the 
behaviour of exchange and interest rate risk under the hypotheses of 
perfect and imperfect credibility of the exchange rate agreement, 
respectively. The final section briefly summarises the main findings of the 
paper. 
2. A SIMPLE MACROECONOMIC MODEL 
The model presented in this section takes as its starting point the 
model developed by Svensson (1994), and incorporates three basic 
innovations that are, as is later seen, decisive in explaining the usual 
empirical findings. First, the model allows the price level not to be 
completely flexible. Second, it allows differentiating between supply 
shocks and demand shocks and, within these, between nominal and reel 
shocks. Lastly, in dealing with the credibility of the central parity, the 
model allows credibility to depend not only.on the position of the exchange 
rate in the band but also on the level of the domestic interest rate. As 
discussed later, this dependence is supported by the experience of the 
recent ERM crises. 
The model is summarised In the following set of equations: 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
where m., p" Yt .and y are (the logarithms of) the domestic money 
supply, price level, income level and full-employment income level, 
respectively, i. is the (logarithm of one plus the) domestic interest rate, 
and St and ct represent the (logarithm of the) market exchange rate and 
(the logarithm of) its central parity, each expressed in units of the 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. In turn, t: and p; 
are the corresponding foreign variables, which, assuming the country is 
small, will be considered exogenous. In order to include a typically 
external shock, the level of external prices is normalised to zero, and the 
foreign exchange rate is assumed to be purely random, I.e.: 
(8) 
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The different ",' s represent shocks that are independent and 
Identically distributed over time. Lastly, all the parameters in the model 
are assumed to be non-negative. 
The interpretation of equations (1) to (7) Is simple. The first 
equation is a classic LM in which t.>: is a domestic shock of a monetary 
nature. The second Is an IS in which, first, the relevant rate of inflation 
to determine the real interest rate Is the equilibrium rate of inflation -
which, in this case, Is zero. This assumption Is relatively common and 
avoids the possibility of explosive solutions (see, for example, Beetama 
and van der Ploeg, 1992) . Secondly, it allows the non-verification of the 
purchasing power parity relationship. And, lastly, "'� is interpreted as 
a domestic shock of a real nature, typically as a fiscal shock2. 
Equation (3) is a PhI1iips curve in which an income level above that 
of full employment leads to inflation, and output below this level leads to 
deflation. The parameter </> measures the degree of price flexibility, and 
"'� is interpreted as a supply shock, such as a fall in productivity or 
a wage shock, for example. 
Equation (4) is the known relationship of uncovered interest rate 
parity', and equations (5) and (6) characterise the credibility problem, 
which, as demonstrated in Ayuso et al. (1994), plays a crucial role in 
explaining the behaviour of exchange rate risk. Thus, the exchange rate 
commitment becomes less credible the more the market rate moves away 
from the central parity. Note that, given the equation's linear nature, 
this method of modelling the lsck of credibility is compatible both with the 
existence of an only partial "honeymoon" effect, in line with Krugman 
(1991), and with the existence of a "divorce" effect, in line with Bertola 
2 It could also be interpreted in terms of a shock to foreign prices, 
since these have been normalised to o. 
, Ayuso and Restoy (1996) find that, in the case of the ERM, the 
possible risk premia are quantitatively limited. In any event, the 
existence of a risk premium could be incorporated with no difficulty (as 
long as it does not depend on the levels of the endogenous variables) by 
reinterpreting t as an interest rate net of risk. 
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and Caballero (1992) . In any case, both works provide a justification for 
the presence of xt in equation (6) . 
In addition, credibility is made to depend on the level of the 
domestic interest rate. The presence of the interest rate in equation 6 
reflects the economic policy dilemma that arises when the interest rate 
level, which the monetary authorities must maintain for the exchange rate 
to remain in the exchange rate commitment, is too high from the 
standpoint of the domestic cyclical position. If this dilemma is perceived 
as such by the public, a rise in the interest rate -while possibly 
attracting foreign capital and, in this way, causing the exchange rate to 
appreciate- will also lead to a loss of credibility of the current central 
parity, with the resulting tendency to depreciate. The crisis that shook 
the ERM as from the summer of 1992 is a good example of this type of 
situation, with attacks on the currencies of countries that had carried out 
as many as two devaluations (as the case of t.he peseta in May 1993) but 
had maintained relatively high interest rates amid slack, and even 
sli.ding, domestic demand. In fact, in the more recent literature on 
exchange rate crises, the level of interest rates figures as the pivotal 
variable in explaining why fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate systems 
collapse. Examples of this literature are the works of Bensaid and Jeanne 
(1994), Obstfeld (1994), and Ozkan and Sutherland (1994) . 
According to equation (6) , credibility depends on variables that are 
endogenous in the model (xt and 4) and is, therefore, ultimately 
determined by the behaviour of the central bank. It is likely that 
variables that are exoge�ous to the model (political events, natural 
disasters, incorporation of new members in the exchange rate agreement, 
etc.) also have some effect on credibility. However, at least with respect 
to the objectives of this paper, the exogenous component of credibility 
plays no role at all, whence its exclusion from this analysis. 
Lastly, equation (7) depicts the behaviour of the monetary 
authority, who determines the money stock by means of the control 
variable Uv which reflects not only open-market transactions but also 
possible interventions in the foreign exchange market. In this respect, 
it will be assumed that the central bank chooses the values of ut that 
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minimise the weighted sum of the fluctuations in price, income, interest 
rate and exchange rate levels. Concretely, since the variables have been 
normalised such that the mean of the different shocks is null, the function 
that the central bank will minimise is the following: 
E,[E 1l'(qPP� +qyy� +q,i! +q�) I (9) 
.01 
The behaviour of the monetary authority calls for several 
observations. The presence of prices and income in equation (9) probably 
does not require any particular comment. It should simply be noted that, 
in general, the greater autonomy of the central bank will tend to be 
reflected in a relatively larger value of qp than that of qy. The 
stabilisation of the interest rate is also a frequent target of the monetary 
authority (see, for example, Goodfriend, 1987 and 1991 ) .  The presence 
of the exchange rate -or, more specifically, of its deviation from its 
central parity- does, however, require a more detailed explanation. 
First, it should be emphasised that the existence of fluctuation 
bands is not explicitly modelled in equations (1) to (9) . The explicit 
modelling of the bands would give rise to a non-linear intervention rule 
that would considerably complicate the problem. Iustead, a linear 
credibility rule (like the one in equation 7) and the presence of X. in the 
target function allow, as we shall see, for the application of dynamic 
optimisation tools in a linear-quadratic context. As Svensson (1994) 
points out, given the solution of the model with x. in equation (9) it is 
possible to define implicit bands in terms of the probability assigned to 
the fact that the exchange rate could lie outside these bands. By way of 
example, if the exchange rate follows a normal distribution, a band 
defined as ±3 standard deviations implies a probability of less than 0.3"" 
that the exchange rate could lie outside this band. In any event, given 
the central banks' common practice of intervening not so much at the 
limits of the bands but rather within them (see Mastropasqua, Micossi and 
Rinaldi, 1988) , it is reasonable to believe that an approximation of the 
explicit bands through a linear dirty float rule and implicit bands 
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probably suffices. The empirical works of Lindberg and Soderlind (1992) 
for the Swedish case confirm this impression. 
Starting from this portrayal of the exchange rate commitment in 
terms of implicit bands, the perameter CJ. reflects the width of these 
hands: the greater CJ. , the lesser the exchange rate variability and, 
consequently, the lesser the width of the bands or, whet Is the same, the 
greater the rigidity of the exchange rate agreement. Thus, the exchange 
rate appears in equation (9) as a way of approximating the monetary 
authority's institutional commitment to exchenge rate stability. 
Second, it should be noted thet, rather than the variability of the 
exchange rate (s.) , whet appears is the variability of its deviation from 
the central perity (x.). However, given equation (9) ,'it follows thet the 
central parity is not an instrument of monetary policy. The only 
instrument available to the monetary authority for meeting its objectives 
is u •. Given thet the central perity remains constant, both variabilities 
are, from its point of view, equal. But, from the public's viewpoint, the 
two variabilities could be different insofar as the exchange rate 
commitment is not perfectly credible. 
The reason why the central parity stays constant in the model stems 
from the fact thet the changes in the central parity are not relevant for 
the trade-off between exchange rate risk and interest rate risk, whereas 
the expectations of agents about these changes definitely are relevant. 
From this standpoint, the inclusion of a stochastic process for the central 
parity consistent with equation (6) would complicate the analysis without 
adding anything substantial. As in Svensson ( 1994), given the constancy 
of the central parity, the credibility problems depicted in equation (6) 
can be interpreted in terms of the central ban)<'s difficulty in convincing 
agents of the sounduess of its commitment to exchange rate stability (and 
not in terms of the weakness of the same)'. 
• Although this situation in which the central bank maintaIns the 
parity and agents do not expect it to do so in the future cannot continue 
indefinitely. 
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3. THE NUMERICAL SOLUTION OF THE MODEL 
Starting from equation (9) and the restrictions Imposed by tbe set 
of equations (1) to (8) , it is possible to analyse whether or not a trade-off 
exists between exchange rete risk and interest rete risk by simply 
chAnging the value of q,. and comparing the results of the optimisation 
problem that the central bank faces in each case. 
The minimisation of (9) subject to restrictions (1) to (8) constitutes 
a classic optimisation problem in a linear-quadretic context in which one 
variable, the exchange rete, is forward-locking. Thus, let us represent 
as X. the vector of variables which, at time t, are exogenous or 
predetermined: 
v = [,.,p ,.,. "Y ,., '  C Y P x I m 1 � -tJ -tJ ..... tJ -tJ tJ t-l' t-l' t-l' t-l' �-1 
and as Zt the enlargement of this vector with the model's only forward­
looking variable. xt: 
A little algebre allows the above optimisation programme to be 
rewritten in the following terms': 
subject to the linear restriction 
• Appendix 1 gives the detalls of the specific form taken by the 
different matrices that appear below. 
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�+l 6)t+l 
= 
AZt + BUt + , t =1 , 2, ... 
E"xt+1 J l 0 J 
The above programme is a variant of the standard minimisation 
programme of a quadratic function subject to a linear constraint. This 
variation stems from the fact that one of the variables of the state vector 
at time t (the deviation of the exchange rate from its central parity) is 
neither exogenous nor predetermined at that moment J but instead depends 
on the expectations about the future of other variables. Oudiz and Sachs 
(1985) and Backus and Driffill (1986) describe an algorithm for obtaining 
the numerical solution of this variant of the problem that, in the general 
case, cannot be resolved analytically. 
The presence of forward-looking variables poses a classic problem 
of time consistency (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977) , such that the final 
solution will depend on the central bank's capacity to commit itself 
convincingly to follow in the future the monetary rule that resolves the 
optimisation programme in the present6• Insofar as this paper does not 
analyse the central bank's credibility problems related to the monetary 
rule7,8, it is assumed that no mechanism exists whereby the central bank 
can commit itself to maintaining the monetary rule in the future. In these 
conditions, the central bank optimises each period, and the solution of the 
programme corresponds to what Backus and Driffill (1986) call the 
discretionary solution. Appendix 2 presents a brief summary of the 
method proposed by these authors for resolving numerically the 
optimisation programme in the discretionary case. 
6 Note that, here, time consistency refers to decisions on Uv not the 
time consistency relative to decision on ct discussed in the text. 
7 Note that the monetary rule (7) is known and believed by the 
public, but the "exchange rate rule" (-ct = constant) is not. 
• In the same respect, the possible existence of an effect related to 
an anti-inflationary reputation gain is not taken into consideration. For 
this aspect, see Weber (1991, 1992), Giavazzi and Pagano (1988 ) ,  and 
Revenga (1993) . 
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The model's numerical solution requires specifying the values taken 
by its parameters and those which characterise the distribution of the 
different shocks. Thus, to determine whether or not a trade-off exists 
between exchange rate risk and interest rate risk, we carried out a series 
of normalisations and set certain values for the parameters in order to 
create a base scenario. By altering the values of this scenario, it will be 
possible to analyse not only the existence of the aforementioned trade-off, 
but also its sensitivity to changes in the basic characteristics of the 
economy. The values that make up this base scenario are discussed below. 
To stsrt with, the full employment income level (y) , and the 
external price level (po), are normalised to zero. The variance of the 
different shocks is normalised to 1 .  As to the LM and IS parameters, both 
k and a are set equal to 1 ;  11 to 0.2, and 6 to 0.4. Prices in this base 
scenario are considered to be flexible (4) = 1000), and the weightings of 
price fluctuations (qp)' the interest rate (q,) and income (qy) are set at 
1, 0.5 and 0, respectively. Natura1iy, there is a certsin degree of 
arbitrariness in the choice of the parameters I values. 
An attempt is made to minimise the possible effects of this 
arbitrariness in two ways. First, in very broad terms, the values chosen 
do not excessively veer from the scant empirical evidence available. 
Thus, the LM parameters are consistent with the available estimations of 
money demand functions for several of the System's member countries. 
The limited sensitivity of the real variables to changes in the interest rate 
(less than their sensitivity to changes in real exchange rates) is also a 
widely accepted fact. Moreover, the absence of the variability of output 
in the tsrget function (qy =0) not only reflects the greater attention of 
monetsry authorities to the problem of price stability that has recently 
been observed in EU countries, but also the increasingly greater 
independence of the central banks in these countries'. Second, an 
attempt is made to minimise the possible biases derived from the choice of 
specific parameters by carrying out a detailed analysis of the sensitivity 
of the results to changes in these parameters. 
• By way of example, the Autonomy Law of the Banco de Espaila 
entered into effect in June 1994. 
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The model's solution for different values of q. allows us to obtain 
the optimum combinations of exchange rate and interest rate risk 
according to varying degrees of exchange rate commitment. The 
representation of these combinations will show whether or not a trade-off 
exists between the two types of risk. In principle, it will be assumed that 
the exchange rate commitment is perfectly credible, whence both V, and 
V2 in equation (6) are considered equal to zero. As shown in Ayuso at.al 
(1994) , under perfect credibility 'observed' variability and risk coincide. 
As will be commented later, this is not the case if credibility is imperfect. 
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXCHANGE RATE AND INTEREST 
RATE RISK UNDER PERFECT CREDIBILITY 
4.1 On what does the existence of a risk trade-off depend? 
Chart 1 shows the optimum combinations of volatility (concretely, 
of standard deviations) that correspond to different degrees of rigidity 
in the exchange rate commitment for the parameters in the base scenario. 
Increases in the value of q. (narrowing of the implicit bands) cause shifts 
throughout the curve from right to left. As can be seen, there is a first 
tranche in which the increases in the commitment's rigidity reduce both 
the volatility of the exchange rate and the volatility of the interest rate. 
However, beyond a certain level of exchange rate stability, further 
increases in stability can only be achieved if increases in interest rate 
volatility are aC5'epted. The obvious question that arises now refers to the 
conditions that determine whether, in terms of the curve in Chart 1, the 
positive or the negative slope predominates. 
In this respect, since the variance in any of the variables will 
ultimately depend on the variance in the shocks that affect the economy, 
it is worthwhile inquiring about the effects of each one separately. Recall 
that the distinction between several types of shock is one of the 
innovations of tbis model with respect to Svensson's. Moreover, the 
analysis gives us a better understanding of the basic mechanisms that 
govern the behaviour of the relevant variables: the exchange rate and the 
interest rate. 
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Charts 2.1 to 2.3 show the relationShip between the relevant 
variances when one of the shocks dominates10• Concretely J for each 
case, the variance in the related shock was set equal to 100. Note, first, 
that the comparison of Chart 2.1 with Chart 1 reveals that the domestic 
monetary shock is not relevant in determining whether or not the trade­
off occurs. The explanation for this result is the following: equation (1)  
shows that a domestic monetary shock can b e  fully counteracted by a 
contrary movement in the money supply, without affecting any of the 
remaining variables of the equation (and, by extension, of the system) • .  
Therefore, greater monetary shocks will solely translate into a greater 
variability in the stock of money. Thus, the result is easily explained in 
terms of the central bank's capacity, within the framework of the model, 
to control the money supply. 
In turn, the comparison of Charts 1 and 2.2 shows that, when real 
domestic shocks predominate, the trade-off vanishes entirely, and both 
variances move in the same direction. Equation (2) is the key relationship 
in explaining this result. Accordingly, in the event of a real shock, the 
monetary authority cannot simultaneously reestablish the income and 
interest rate levels as it could in the presence of a monetary shock. 
Moreover, equation (3) limits its scope for action, because, if the 
monetary authority allows a reduction in the interest rate, it will at the 
same time have to allow a depreciation in the exchange rate, which would 
generate expectations of a future appreciation to offset the new interest 
rate differential. Therefore, when the monetary authority reacts to the 
shock by attempting to stabilise the exchange rate, it is J in fact J 
stabilising the interest rate, and vice versa. 
Lastly, if shocks to the external interest rate predominate (see 
Chart 2 .3 ) ,  the trade-off is total. Once again, equation (3) provides an 
explanation of this phenomenon. Thus, faced with a shock to a foreign 
interest rate, the monetary authority can choose between absorbing the 
10 Since prices are flexible in the base scenario, 6>: loses the 
interpretation in terms of a supply shock that it was given in section 2 .  
In any event, increases in its variance do not affect the trade';'oCr, and, 
as expected, they translate exclusively into increases in the income 
variance. 
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effects of the shock by altering the domestic interest rate or by altering 
the exchange rate, that generates the related expectations of future 
movement. The greater the importance that the central bank confers to 
exchange rate stability t the lesser the exchange rate movements that it 
is willing to accept and, consequently, the greater the sacrifices in terms 
of interest rate instability that it will have to accept. 
In sum, the simple analysis of Charts 1 and 2 sheds light on the 
conditions that favour the existence of a trade-off between excbange rate 
volatility and interest rate volatility: the greater the weight of the 
external interest rate shocks in relation to real domestic (demand) 
shocks, the greater the likelihood that a trade-off exists. Chart 3, which 
depicts the combinations of equilibrium varisnces for different values of 
V(",')/V(",y) ,illustrates this point, and it also shows that the trade­
off is more unfavourable (a higher level of interest rate volatility 
assoc!sted with the same level of exchange rate volatility), when the 
relative weight of the external interest rate shocks increases. 
Given this relationship between the relative importance of the 
shocks and the existence of a trade-off, it is possible to interpret the 
changes in the degree of concern for exchange rate stability (changes in 
'I.) in terms of changes in the relative attention that the monetary 
authorities pay to the different shocks. Thus, at a null level of 'I., the 
central bank does not react at all to external shocks, which are absorbed 
by exchange rate movements, and confines itself to responding to real 
domestic shocks. Increases in q. would be interpreted in terms of a 
progressively greater reaction to shocks. to the external interest rate, to 
the detriment of the attention paid to domestic shocks. In an initial stage, 
the reaction to domestic shocks would continue to dominate, equation (2) 
would be the relevant expression for determining the relationship between 
exchange rate volatility and interest rate volatility, and there would be 
no trade-off. Beyond a certain level, however, the reaction to foreign 
interest rate shocks would come to dominate the central bank's actions, 
whence equation (4) would become the relevant equation for the analysis, 
and, consequently, the trade-off would arise. This interpretation of the 
changes in qxJ in the sense of the monetary authority's greater attention 
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to nominal external shocks, is quite coherent with the general intuition 
regarding the e;ignificance of an exchange rate commitment. 
4 . 2  The effects o f  changes in the model's parameters 
In order to bring the range in which the two volatilities rise closer 
to the range in which the move in different directions, the quotient 
V(",*)/V(",E) was given a value equal to 2. The most relevant results 
are summarised below. 
Chart 4 illustrates the effect of the changes in one of the most 
relevant parameters of the model: the sensitivity of investment to the 
interest rate, '1. As can be seen, the greater this sensitivity is, the 
lesser is the level of the volatility of the interest rate associated with each 
level of exchange rate volatility, without the relationship between the two 
losing its U shape. Here agaiD., this result seems quite sensible. Given a 
certain level of commitment to exchange rate stability and regardless of 
the nature of the shock (external in the trade-off zone or domestic in the 
rising arm of the U), the interest rate movement that must be accepted to 
absorb this shock will be lesser, the greater the real effect of this 
movement is. 
This same intuition helps to explain the results in Chart 5 :  the more 
sensitive the external balance is to changes in the level of the real 
exchange rate 6, the greater the real effect of the movement in the 
exchange rate that allows a given level of commitment to exchange rate 
stability an�, therefore, the lesser the additional movement needed in the 
interest rate. 
Changes in the parameters of the LM, however, do not affect the 
trade-off. The same reasoning that explains the irrelevance of the 
monetary shocks helps to explain that the greater sensitivity of money 
demand to changes in income (k) or in the interest rate (a) simply 
translates into changes in the supply of money that much be injected in 
or drained from the economy to achieve the desired movement. 
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The sacrifice in terms of interest rate volatility that must be 
accepted in exchange for a certain degree of exchange rate stability is all 
the greater, the more flexible prices are. Chart 6 shows the changes in 
the relationship between volatilities amid changes in the parameter cp. 
This result, which seems somewhat counter-intuitive, can be explained in 
the following terms. Faced with a given shock, a greater degree of price 
stickiness allows keeping the full employment income level at bay for a 
longer time. Therefore, given a certain level of exchange rate stability, 
the movements in the interest rate level needed to absorb the shock can 
be spaced over a longer time. Consequently, a significant change can be 
replaced by a succession of small changes, and the variance is reduced. 
Naturally, the counterpart is that the volatility levels of income and 
prices increase considerably as the value of cP diminishes. 
Lastly, Chart 7 shows the effects of an increase in the relative 
Importance that the central bank attaches to the stability of output in a 
context of sticky prices -concretely, where 4> = 111. In this case, as seen 
in the chart, the terms of the relationship between volatilities become 
more unfavourable: higher levels of interest rate volatility for the same 
level of exchange rate volatility arise when there is an increase in the 
relative weight of real stabilisation in the target function of the central 
bank. Intuitively, the result is the following: faced with a given shock -
real and domestic or external- and after determining the portion of the 
shock that can be absorbed by the exchange rate ('I.) and prices (q.), a 
greater value of qy means that the interest rate must absorb a greater 
portion of the shock, to the advantage of the income level. 
To summarise, it can be said that, in a context of perfect credibility 
of the exchange rate commitment, the existence of a trade-off between 
interest rate volatility and exchange rate volatility will be all the more 
probable, the greater the relative weight of the foreign interest rate 
11 Logically, if prices are completely flexible, the income level will be 
stable around its full employment level, and, therefore, changes in the 
parameter qy have no effect at all. The less flexible prices are, the 
greater the changes that arise in the relationship between exchange rate 
and interest rate volatility, although these changes only acquire a certain 
relevance for very low levels of flexibility. 
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shocks in terms of real domestic shocks. Likewise, the level of interest 
rate volatility that will have to be accepted in exchange for achieving a 
given level of exchange rate stability is all the greater, the less sensitive 
investment is to interest rates, the less sensitive net external demand is 
to the real exchange rate, the more flexible prices are, and the lesser the 
central bank's relative concern for income stabilisation. 
5. IMPERFECT CREDmILITY OF THE EXCHANGE RATE COMMlTMENT 
5.1 Exchange rate and interest rate volatility under imperfect 
credibility 
In the terms of equation (6 ) ,  the credibility problems are modelled 
through the parameters y, and y, . In accordance with this equation, 
a positive value of y, implies a loss of credibility due to the exchange 
rate's deviation from its central parity. Chart 9 shows how the 
relationship between the variances in exchange and interest rates moves 
in response to changes in the value of y, . Several effects must be 
distinguished. 
First, focusing on the zone in which a trade-off takes place 
(namely, in the falling arm of the U), the greater the Information value 
that agents assign to deviations in the exchange rate, the worse the 
conditions are in which the trade-off takes place. The explanation of this 
result is as follows: faced with a shock to the external interest rate -here 
we are in the trade-off zone- and given a certain level of concern for 
exchange rate stability, the central bank finds that the deviations which 
it could allow in the exchange rate under perfect credibility to prevent 
the interest rate from having to bear the entire weight of the adjustment 
lead to a loss of credibility in the maintenance of the parity. This loss of 
credibility amplifies the impact of the shock on the interest rate insofar 
as the latter must undergo a greater correction. Therefore, increases in 
the parameter y, shift the falling arm of the U upwards and towards the 
right. 
-
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Second, in the zone in which both variances move in the same 
direction, the existence of credibility problems improves the relationship 
between the two. This result, counter-intuitive at first sight, is, 
however, consistent with the logic of the model. Thus, as noted, the 
rising tranche of the U can be interpreted as a tranche in which the 
reactions to real domestic shocks predominate. Under perfect credibility, 
amid a real domestic shock, a given depreclation of the exchange rate 
should be accompanied, as a result of equation (3), by a reduction in the 
interest rate which, on the one hand, absorbed part of the shock and, on 
the other, offset the expectations of a future appreciation generated by 
the movement in the exchange rate. Now, however, the very depreciation 
of the exchange rate generates, through equation (6), devaluation 
expectations that act as a counterweight to the expectations of a future 
appreclation. As a result, the interest rate must be reduced less, thus 
exp1aining the improvement in the terms of the relationship between the 
variances. 
Lastly, Chart 8 shows that increases in the information content of 
x. increase the range of values of 'lx for which the trade-off is produced. 
The intuition of this result is that the less credible the exchange rate 
agreement Ie, the greater the relative attention that the central bank 
should pay to external shocks in dealing with the same target of economic 
stability. 
As to the credibility problems assoclated with the economic policy 
dilemma (positive values of Y 2)' Chart 9 shows how, unlike what occurred 
in the previous case, increases in the parameter y 2 cause the curves to 
shift upwards, but without crossing each other, thus implying more 
unfavourable risk combinations in all cases. Note that, contrary to what 
occurred when credibility depended on x.' in the rising tranche of the 
curve the relationship between the two tranches also worsens. In this 
case, amid a real domestic shock that requires, as before, a certain 
depreciation in the exchange rate and also a reduction in the interest 
rate, it turns out that, when Y:I: is positive, this interest rate movement 
heightens the expectations of an appreciation even more than in the case 
of perfect credibility. Therefore, unless there is a willingness to accept 
a greater alteration in the exchange rate, the interest rate must be 
-
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reduced further. Naturally, for the situation not to become explosive, the 
parameter y 2 must be lower than 1 .  
5.2 Differences between volatility and rlak 
Throughout the previous subsection, the term risk was avoided, 
using instead the term volatility. This is not a chance substitution, 
because the existence of imperfect credibility introduces a difference, at 
times substantial, between the two. 
In this respect, the Incorporation of equation (6) means that the 
central hank and individuals have a different perception of the variance 
in the market exchange rate St. Thus, whereas in the case of the former 
the variances of St and xt coincide J in the case of individuals, who assign 
a non-null probability that the central parity will change, the two 
variances differ. This fact allows for a differentiation between the 
exchange rate variability that the agents "observe" -i.e. volatility-and 
the relevant variance for determining the risk they perceive -i. e. risk. 
Thus, since the monetary authority does not change the central parity, 
the agents observe that 
(10) 
However, the variability of the market exchange rate that they 
anticipate is 
(11) 
Thus, subtracting equation (10) from equation (11) yields the 
correction term that must be added to the term referred to as volatility 
(the variance obtained on the basis of the exchange rate's observed 
behaviour) to quantify the exchange rate risk in the presence of 
imperfect credibility. 
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Therefore, the consideration of positive values of Y 1 and Y 2 allows 
for an �ysls of whether, in the framework of the previous model, a rlae 
in the observed exchange rate variability and a decrease in exchange rate 
risk can be recorded simultaneously, as found in Ayuso et al. (1994) . In 
principle, the existence of a trade-off between the volatilities of the 
exchange rate and the interest rate, together with the effects of each on 
credibility, points towards the possibility that, at least beyond a certain 
level, the improvements in credibility derived from greater exchange rate 
stability could be amply counteracted by the negative impact on this 
credibility produced by the larger swings in the interest rate. Note that, 
in the context of Svensson's model It is not possible for a difference to 
arise in the behaviour of exchange rate volatility and risk. 
Equation (6) only provides information on the conditional average 
of the central parity. More structure must be Incorporated in the model 
to obtain information on the conditional variance of St' ror the sake of 
symmetry with the analysis in Ayuso et al. (1994), it will be assumed that 
the process which, in the view of agents, the central parity follows Is: 
c. , prob.=l-q 
Ct., (12) 
ct+dv prob. =q 
I. e. agents assign a probability q that there will be a change in the 
central parity of a magnitude of dt• ror this process to be consistent with 
equation (6), It must therefore hold that 
Given the difficulties of endogenislng this probability within the 
linear-quadratic context in which the study is developed, probability q 
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is considered exogenous12• In the presentation of the model and, more 
concretely, in the discussion of equation (6), we noted the possibility 
that factors exogenous to the model could also affect the credibility 
assigned by agents to the exchange rate commitment . Consequently, q 
would represent the average level of the effect of these factors . 
If the agents do not expect a simultaneous jump in xt and in ct' it 
is easy to prove that the term in covariances of equation (11) disappears 
and that the correction term which must be added in equation (10) to 
calculate exchange rate risk in the context of this model (the mean value 
of the conditional variance of the future central parity) takes the 
following form: 
Chart 10 shows the values of the observed variability of the 
exchange rate and the levels of exchange risk corresponding to a scenario 
in which Var( "';) /Var( "'!) = 10 (such that a trade-off exists if 
credibility is perfect) ,  and the parameters 1, and 1, take' the same value: 
0.4. The rest of the parameters take the values of the base scenario. As 
can be seen, the volatility of the exchange rate diminishes monotonously 
with ct.. However, the level of exchange risk is U-shaped. In other 
words, as of a certain level of commitment to exchange rate stability, an 
easing in this comJ:!rl.tment, even though translating into a rise in exchange 
rate volatility, can lead to a gaIn in credibility that offsets the previous 
effect, such that the final result is a reduction -and not an increase- in 
the exchange rate risk. This situation will tend to occur at lower degrees 
of commitment (lower values of ct.) , the greater 12 is in relation to 11 and 
the lower the probability q is. 
12 Drazen and Masson (1994) give an interesting example of the 
endogenisation of the probability of realignments based on an 
apprenticeship rule after Bayes' formula, in the framework of a Barro­
Gordon model . 
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The obvious implication of this result is that , from the standpoint 
of the minimisation of exchange risk , it might be advisable to refrain from 
excessively tightening the degree of rigidity of the exchange rate 
commitment implicit in an agreement such as the ERM, if the new 
commitment is not credible enough to the economic agents . If there are 
problems of credibility, a more relaxed agreement (wider bands) could 
reduce the risk level even though it raises the level of volatility. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In its Resolution of December 5,  1978, the European Council set as 
the objective of the nascent European Monetary System the promotion of 
the nominal stability of the member economies . Since then there has been 
an obvious interest in learning, first, whether membership of the 
System's exchange rate mechanism has led to an easing in the risk 
associated with the behaviour of the participating currencies' exchange 
rates, and, second, if so, whether this reduction in exchange rate risk 
has translated into a simultaneous rise in the interest rates risk. In this 
paper , the above-mentioned problem is addressed from a theoretical 
perspective , presenting a simple macroeconomic model that allows for an 
estimation of the optimum risk combinations from the viewpoint of the 
monetary authority, starting from the numerical solution of a relatively 
standard linear-quadratic optimisation programme , with forward-looking 
variables . 
The model's results indicate that the key explanatory variables in 
the relationship between the two types of risk and the exchange rate 
commitment adopted by the authorities are the degree of credibility of this 
commitment and the relative importance of the different shocks that affect 
the economy. Thus , even though the greater width of the bands 
(including free flotation in one particular case) inevitably increases the 
variability observed in the behaviour of the exchange rate, the model 
shows that , beyond a certain level , an additional widening of the bands 
could, nonetheless, entail a lesser exchange risk. This will be the case if 
the credibility of the new regime runs up against the existence of 
economic policy dilemmas derived from differences in the interest rate 
- 26 -
needed for the maintenance of exchange rate stability and the interest 
rate that the domestic cyclical position requires. The presence of these 
dilemmas -one of the model's main contributions- is supported by the 
attacks unleashed during the crisis in the ERM on the currencies of 
economies that did not see significant losses in competitiveness (or had 
solved them after one or two devaluations) ,  but maintained high interest 
rate levels in relation to their cyclical position . 
As to the relationship between exchange and interest rate risk 
under different degrees of rigidity in the ERM, the model's results show 
that a trade-off relationship will tend to appear in those cases in which 
external interest rate shocks predominate over rea! domestic shocks . 
Moreover, this trade-off will be all the more unfavourable, i. e. will imply 
a greater level of interest rate risk for the same level of exchange rate 
risk, the lesser the elasticities of aggregate demand to the interest rate 
and the rea! exchange rate, the greater the flexibility of prices, the 
greater the central bank's concern for the stability of the level of output, 
the greater the dependence of the credibility of the exchange commitment 
on the exchange rate's position in the band , and the greater the relevance 
of the existence of the aforementioned economic policy dilemma . 
The paper's findings , briefly summarised in the preceding 
paragraphs, have severa! interesting implications for economic policy. 
First, one conclusion of the paper is that a system of fixed but also 
adjustable exchange rates , like the ERM, can contribute notably to 
reducing exchange risk. ·This stabilising effect, however, is not 
automatically derived from membership of the exchange rate agreement . 
For this to occur, economic agents must perceive ERM membership as 
sustainable. Thus, the tirlnimisation of exchange risk requires a certain 
equilibrium between the degree of rigidity of the commitment (measured 
in terms of the width of the fluctuation bands) and the effects of this 
rigidity on the agreement's credibility. In this respect , relatively wide 
bands could be preferable in a framework in which additional limits on 
exchange rate movements are not perceived as credible by economic 
agents. In any event , according to the paper's findings, the optimum 
width of the fluctuation band would appear to differ greatly from the band 
width that would correspond to a free float system . 
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Second , the paper's results also show that the reduction in 
exchange risk through a formal commitment to exchange rate stability 
exacts a price in terms of greater interest rate risk only for those 
economies whose performance is very dependent on the shocks that 
asymmetrically affect the anchor country (or countries) of the exchange 
rate agreement. For economies in which external interest rate shocks and 
(real) domestic demand shocks play a less unequal role, there Is leeway 
for reducing both types of risk simultaneously via the replacement of a 
free float exchange rate system by membership of an exchange agreement 
such as the ERM. This leeway will be all the greater, the more relevant 
the role played by domestic shocks and also the greater the degree of 
credibility assigned by agents to the maintenance of the exchange rate 
commitment in the future . 
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APPENDIX 1 
The matrices of the central bank's optimisation problem take the 
following form: 
where 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A -
- A, 
- - Ap 
0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 o 0 I 
-
- Ai 
0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
- - Ax 
A, = [ 0 ,  O.'!, --{l(6+.'! ) ,  0 ,  06, 0 ,  -0(6+.'!) , 0 , 0, O.'!, -(6) 
a a Q a 
Ap = 4>� + [0, 0, 1 , 0, 0 , 0, 1 , 0 , 0 , 0, 0] 
(k+4> ) ( I -y,) y,-I l -y, l -y, y,-1 Ax 
= 
Ay + [O, __ , __ , -1 , O, O, __ , O, O , __ , 1-y11 
a a Q a a 
I Ai = __ Ay + l -y, 
1 [0, 0 , 0, __ , 0 , 0 ,  0, 0 ,  0 , 0, Y1-1] 
l -y, 
1 0 = r __ , 
1 +64> 
r = [ 1 + '1 (k+cj» r' 
( 1  +64» 0 
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and, lastly, 
(k +4> ) ( I -V,l 
Bx = ____ ....::....By 
I -V, 
a a 
B, = _1_Bx I -V, 
- 0 -
. . 
Q = qyA,.Ay + qpA.Ap t q. A.A. + q.AxAx 
- 0 -
. . 
U 
= qyAyBy + qpApBp + q,A,B, 
- 0 -
. . 
R 
= qyByBy + qpBpBp + q, B,B. 
- 0 -
- 0 -
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APPENDIX 213 
The maximisation of (9) subject to the set of linear restrictions in 
(1) to (8) provides the optimum sequence of interventions by the central 
bank {u.} '''.'. . . However, the optimality of this sequence is subject to 
a classic problem of time consistency: after announcing the rule at time t ,  
the monetary authority has J at time t+ 1 ,  a clear incentive to deviate from 
the same by reoptimising and announcing a new rule . In these conditions, 
if there is no mechanism that guarantees the commitment by the central 
bank, the variables , which, at t, are forward-looking, will depend 
exclusively on the variables predetermined at the same instant t. I .  e .  , in 
assuming discretion in the exercise of monetary policy, a new linear 
restriction must be added, which takes the form : 
where C is an endogenously determined vector . 
Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and Backus and Driffill (1986) prove that 
the stationary solution to the above optimisation programme is 
Ut = -F·Xt 
Xt 
= 
(A · -B 'P·)Xt_1 + c.>t 
xt = eXt 
where A', B ' ,  F', C and V· (defined below) are the respective limits of 
the sequences At' Bv F t' Ct and V t when t ... -4) • These sequences are 
constructed as follows. 
• • Let us assume that we know Ct+l �d V t+l . Ct and V t are 
obtained in the following way. First, the matrices A, B ,  Q and U are 
decomposed in consonance with the breakdown of Zt in terms of Xt and xt: 
A 
A" 
, Q = 
A" J J' Q" Q" 
B = 
B, 
J' B ,  
U = 
U, 
U, 
13 This appendix very closely follows Appendix 1 in Svensson (1994 ) .  
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The matrices Dt and Gt are then constructed: 
On the basis of Dt and Gt> it follows that 
and 
The above equations allow a new optimisation programme to be 
defined in terms of the variables with asterisks , where the problem of time 
consistency disappears. The matrices F; and V; are obtained from the 
solution of this new programme , i .  e. : 
Lastly, vector Ct is updated : 
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Although the algorithm is quite complex and, in principle, it is not 
easy to identify the theoretical conditions that guarantee its convergence 
no problem arose in carrying out any of the exercises. From the random 
matrices V and C and by establishing as the convergence criterion that 
the (absolute) maximum difference between the elements of the matrices 
corresponding to two successive iterations is less than 10-10, the 
convergence occurred after an average of 1 , 800 iterations". The 
solution of the different programmes was maintained amid alterations in 
the algorithm's initial matrices . 
The optimum risk combinations are calculated as follows. FIrst, it 
is easy to check that the solution of the programme can be written in the 
following way 
where 
, r A'-B 'F' 0 M = 
l C(A'-B 'F') 0 
I 
Ca)Zt = C J 6)
t 
Therefore, the matrix of variances and covariances of the variables 
will be the matrix En that solves the following equation: 
where 1:%% is the matrix of variances and covariances of the innovations 
,. In addition to satisfying the convergence criterion, the maximum 
difference between elements proved to be always monotonously decreasing 
with the iteration number. 
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Chart 3 Trade-off and the relative Importance of the e)demal shock. 
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Chart 4. Changes in the sensitivity of IS to the interest rate. 
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Chart 5. Changes in the sensitivity of IS to the exchange rate . 
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Chart 6. Changes in the level of price flexibility. 
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Chart 7. Effects of the lesser independence of the central bank. 
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Chart 8. Effects of the imperfect credibility. 
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Chart 9. Effects of the existence of a dilemma. 
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